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Is Labour Market Discrimination against 
Ethnic Minorities Better Explained by 
Taste or Statistics? A Systematic Review 
of the Empirical Evidence*
Scholars have gone to great lengths to chart the incidence of ethnic labour market 
discrimination. To effectively mitigate this discrimination, however, we need to understand 
its underlying mechanisms because different mechanisms lead to different counteracting 
measures. To this end, we reviewed the recent literature that confronts the seminal theories 
of taste-based and statistical discrimination against the empirical reality. First, we observed 
that the measurement operationalisation of the mechanisms varied greatly between 
studies, necessitating the development of a measurement standard. Second, we found 
that 20 out of 30 studies examining taste-based discrimination and 18 out of 34 studies 
assessing statistical discrimination produced supportive evidence for said mechanisms. 
However, (field) experimental research, which predominantly focuses on hiring outcomes, 
yielded more evidence in favour of taste-based vis-à-vis statistical discrimination, suggesting 
that the taste-based mechanism might better explain ethnic discrimination in hiring.
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1. Introduction 
Labour market discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity per definition implies the 
disadvantageous, differential treatment of minority group members on the basis of their 
ethnic characteristics (Blank, Dabady, & Citro, 2004; Gaddis, 2018). Both (prospective) 
employees and employers face the negative consequences of this discrimination. On the 
one hand, minority employees (i) repeatedly experience unfavourable treatment when 
applying for a job (Baert, 2018; Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016), which is persistent across many 
European and North American countries (Baert, 2018; Quillian et al., 2019); (ii) are generally 
remunerated worse than their majority counterparts (e.g. Altonji & Pierret, 2001; Barr & 
Oduro, 2002; Charles & Guryan, 2008; Epstein, Gafni, & Siniver, 2016); (iii) are less satisfied 
with their job, less committed to the organisation they work for and more inclined to quit 
(Triana, Jayasinghe, & Pieper, 2015); and (iv) are more likely to experience mental and 
physical health issues (Paradies et al., 2015; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). On the other 
hand, employers who engage in discriminatory hiring practices are, according to a recent 
study, more likely to go out of business in the medium term (Pager, 2016). Our review 
narrows in on the topic of ethnic labour market discrimination by examining the empirical 
evidence of its theoretical mechanisms. 
Historically, economists have described and explained labour market discrimination by 
two leading mechanisms: taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination (Guryan 
& Charles, 2013).1 Taste-based discrimination is based on the notion of (racial) prejudice by 
which personal preferences lead to discrimination against minority employees (Becker, 
1957, 1971; Borjas, 2020). This discrimination mechanism adopts three distinct yet closely 
related forms (Becker, 1971). First, employer discrimination involves an employer 
experiencing distaste from employing a minority employee, as the perceived cost associated 
with hiring this employee exceeds the perceived cost of hiring an equally productive 
employee from the majority group. Second, employee discrimination includes employees 
experiencing distaste (e.g. the perception of lower wages) from working alongside minority 
colleagues. Third, customer discrimination entails customers experiencing distaste (e.g. the 
                                                     
1 For a more detailed overview of the theoretical constructs underpinning these mechanisms we refer to Lang 
and Lehmann (2012) and Neumark (2018). 
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perception of higher prices for goods and services) from interacting with minority 
employees. Employee and customer discrimination might, in turn, result in employers 
discriminating against ethnic minorities despite the fact that they themselves do not have 
any aversion to employing these minorities (e.g. Bodvarsson & Partridge, 2001; Combes, 
Decreuse, Laouénan, & Trannoy, 2016; Laouénan, 2017). Alternatively, statistical 
discrimination is based on the notion of statistical inference by which an employer uses 
information about productivity-related group characteristics to predict the productivity of 
an individual in the absence of perfect information about the true productivity of that 
individual (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; Borjas, 2020; Phelps, 1972). This absence 
arises because only limited information about the individual’s productivity is known or 
because the known information is imprecise (Altonji & Blank, 1999). For example, employers 
may attribute group-level information on language competency, educational attainment or 
personality to a minority candidate, putting them at a disadvantage in terms of 
remuneration or hiring chances (e.g. Carlsson, 2010; Kaas & Manger, 2012; Schaeffer, 
Hoehne, & Teney, 2015). 
While the debate on whether the taste-based or the statistical mechanism better 
explains discrimination has returned to its roots, it is still ambiguous as to which theory 
prevails (Guryan & Charles, 2013).2 On the one hand, the taste-based mechanism focuses 
more on an irrational, subjective animosity expressed by employers, colleagues or 
customers towards ethnic minorities (Becker, 1971). This animosity is so strong that 
individuals are willing to pay a certain price to avoid interaction with members of the 
minority out-group (Becker, 1971). However, in formulating this theory, Becker (1971) did 
                                                     
2 We are aware that there are alternative approaches to explaining labour market discrimination, notably outside 
the field of economics (Guryan & Charles, 2013; Neumark, 2018). Some of the insights from psychological and 
sociological research have already been incorporated into economic research (Guryan & Charles, 2013). 
Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan (2005), for example, put forward ‘implicit discrimination’ as an alternative 
explanation for the findings of their preceding, seminal work (Betrand & Mullainathan, 2004). While there is an 
ongoing debate regarding the psychometric qualities of the implicit association test (IAT), the measure on which 
most implicit discrimination research relies, academics have continued their efforts to examine the relationship 
between IAT outcomes and discriminatory conduct (Blommaert, van Tubergen, & Coenders, 2012; Derous, Ryan, 
& Nguyen, 2012; Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Oswald et 
al., 2013; Rooth, 2010). Nevertheless, our review focuses on taste-based and statistical discrimination, the two 
mechanisms of labour market discrimination that are most firmly rooted in economic theory (Guryan & Charles, 
2013; Neumark, 2018). 
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not state what exactly causes individuals to experience this distaste, but rather explained 
the consequences of discrimination given a set of assumptions (Borjas, 2020). In this respect, 
both sociologists and psychologists have made substantial efforts to outline the possible 
theoretical motives for ethnic hiring discrimination (Derous & Ryan, 2019).3 On the other 
hand, the statistical mechanism focuses more on the rational, objective reaction of 
employers to information asymmetry (Arrow, 1973, 1998; Phelps, 1972). The resulting 
uncertainty about the productivity of the prospective employee incites the employer to 
make an estimation based on (stereotypical) group features (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Altonji & 
Blank, 1999; Arrow, 1998). In contrast to stereotypes as defined by the stereotype content 
model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), the theory of statistical discrimination presumes 
that the attribution of group characteristics is based on data that is on average correct—
that is, until novel information is presented that eventually updates previous beliefs (Altonji 
& Blank, 1999; Borjas, 2020). Moreover, the reaction is profit-maximizing as the employer 
either (i) pursues cost-efficient ways of gaining information about the prospective employee 
by consulting readily available group-level information and, in doing so, avoiding additional 
assessment costs and/or (ii) attempts to mitigate the risk of making a wrong decision that 
could result in, for example, unwanted training costs or lost revenue due to sub-par 
employee productivity (Aigner & Cain, 1977; Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972). 
Following the seminal works of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973), researchers have 
shown great interest in measuring the incidence of labour market discrimination (Gaddis, 
2018). Only since the early 2000s, however, have scholars redirected their focus from 
measuring differences in labour market outcomes for minorities towards uncovering the 
motivation behind discriminatory practices and hence revealing the underlying mechanisms 
of discrimination (Gaddis, 2018; Guryan & Charles, 2013). Several recent studies have 
charted the literature on the prevalence of (ethnic) labour market discrimination and 
subjected it to thorough review (see Baert, 2018; Bartkoski, Lynch, Witt, & Rudolph, 2018; 
Bertrand & Duflo, 2016; Heath & Di Stasio, 2019; Lane, 2016; Lang & Lehmann, 2012; 
Neumark, 2018; Quillian, Pager, Hexel, & Midtbøen, 2017; Quillian et al., 2019; Rich, 2014; 
Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016). Collectively, these reviews surveyed the (field) experimental 
                                                     
3 For a concise overview of the socio-economic and psychological theories of ethnic hiring discrimination we 
refer to Table 1 in Derous and Ryan (2019).  
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evidence and the methods by which labour market discrimination has been measured. Some 
of these studies, in minor order, also elaborated on the empirical relevance of the economic 
mechanisms of discrimination. Rich (2014), for example, concluded that the field 
experimental evidence from the product market literature proved to be consistent with 
statistical discrimination, yet was inconclusive with regard to findings from the labour 
market. Moreover, Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016) applied meta-analytical methods to data 
from previous field experiments on ethnic discrimination in hiring and found diverging 
evidence regarding the mechanisms—a finding that is also shared by Lane (2016) in his 
meta-analysis of laboratory studies on discrimination. However, to date, no study has 
provided us with a systematically composed overview of research that focuses on the 
quantitative, empirical evidence related to the leading economic mechanisms of ethnic 
labour market discrimination. 
Moreover, to effectively combat discriminatory conduct, we need to understand which 
theoretical mechanism explains discrimination best because different mechanisms lead to 
different counteracting measures (Neumark, 2018). An evident measure to counter taste-
based discrimination is increasing the penalty to employers who discriminate, thus 
neutralizing the perceived additional cost associated with hiring a minority employee 
(Neumark, 2018). The implied ‘disutility’ cost is then offset by, for example, a fine which 
discriminatory employers have to pay. In this respect, Hedegaard and Tyran (2018) found 
that discrimination against ethnic minorities was reduced when a financial penalty linked to 
such conduct was introduced. In contrast, a logical counter-response to statistical 
discrimination is issuing interventions that increase the quantity and reliability of 
information about the productivity-related characteristics of the applicant or employee, 
therefore diminishing information asymmetry (Neumark, 2018). Encouraging applicants to 
submit reference letters, academic transcripts, certificates or test scores may, for example, 
augment the amount and/or the quality of information from the employer’s perspective, 
thus lowering the urge to fall back on average group characteristics (Edo, Jacquemet, & 
Yannelis, 2019; Kaas & Manger, 2012; Kristinsson & Sigurdardottir, 2020; Vuolo, Lageson, & 
Uggen, 2017). 
The aim of the current study was threefold. Our first ambition was to survey the existing 
research that quantitatively assesses the empirical evidence regarding taste-based and 
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statistical labour market discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity. For the purpose of this 
review, we considered ethnicity as a broad concept that comprises ethnic components such 
as nationality, culture and religion as well as more racially-oriented characteristics such as 
skin colour (Britannica, 2020). Our second objective was to more closely examine how the 
mechanisms of discrimination were methodologically operationalised and measured in the 
selection of retained studies. Our third goal was to evaluate how the findings contextually 
differed with respect to labour market outcome, region, minority classification and research 
design. By addressing these aims, we aspired to provide answers, from an economic frame 
of reference, to the ‘why’ of ethnic and racial labour market discrimination and therefore 
identify how it can be counteracted. 
2. Methods 
We followed the directives provided by Petticrew and Roberts (2006) with regard to refining 
the central review question, the eligibility criteria for study selection, the literature search 
and the appraisal of the selected studies. We also followed the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting 
Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses) guidelines (Moher et al., 2009) with regard 
to the rationale and objectives of the study, the reporting of the methods and the 
description of the results and discussion section—to the extent they were transferrable to 
the qualitatively-oriented coverage of the review. These guidelines can be viewed as a set 
of minimum required items for reporting in systematic reviews (Moher et al., 2009). In the 
following paragraphs we describe (i) the eligibility criteria (i.e. inclusion and exclusion 
criteria), (ii) the search strategy, including the consulted information sources, and (iii) the 
process of selecting eligible studies. 
2.1. Eligibility criteria 
Table 1 provides an overview of the eligibility criteria used to refine the selection of studies 
included in this review. We adopted the SPIDER-framework (Sample, Phenomenon of 
Interest, Design, Evaluation, Research type) for research retrieval and evaluation (Cooke, 
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Smith, & Booth, 2012). This framework is a systematic search strategy tool focusing on 
qualitative review questions and mixed methods research—both apply to our study. To 
satisfy the aims outlined in the introduction, we adhered to the following standards: (i) the 
‘Sample’ criterium was limited to ethnic and racial minorities; (ii) the ‘Phenomenon of 
Interest’ criterium was restricted to taste-based discrimination and statistical 
discrimination; (iii) the ‘Design’ and ‘Research type’ criteria were limited to primary, 
quantitatively-oriented empirical studies; and (iv) the ‘Evaluation’ criterium was restricted 
to labour market outcomes. Moreover, we only included peer-reviewed articles written in 
English that were published between 2000—the moment around which researchers 
increasingly reoriented their focus towards uncovering the mechanisms of labour market 
discrimination (Gaddis, 2018)—and 2019—the most recent full calendar year. 
<Table 1 about here> 
2.2. Search strategy 
We conducted multiple systematic, electronic searches using relevant, predefined search 
terms related to taste-based and statistical discrimination. First, a basic search was executed 
on the database Web of Science with the keywords ‘taste(-based)’, ‘preference(-based)’, 
‘employer’, ‘employee’, ‘customer’ and ‘statistical’ in combination with ‘discrimination’, 
‘prejudice’ and ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’. Second, a cited reference search was 
performed, also on Web of Science, on the seminal works of Becker (1957, 1971), Arrow 
(1971), Arrow (1973) and Aigner and Cain (1977) using the same keywords to filter relevant 
results.4 For all searches on Web of Science, we a posteriori excluded categories from which 
we expected no relevant results to appear, maintaining our focus on research from the 
social sciences; these were the categories related to arts and humanities (e.g. history and 
literature), life sciences and biomedicine (e.g. medical ethics and sport sciences, with the 
exception of the subcategory ‘behavioural sciences’), physical sciences (e.g. mathematics 
and physics) and technology (e.g. engineering and robotics). Third, the (updated) 
                                                     
4 A cited reference search was conducted to ensure that a maximal proportion of relevant papers was included 
in this review. The search started with the seminal works on the economic theories of labour market 
discrimination. By moving forward in time, a list of studies referring to these works was compiled. After filtering 
on the basis of specific keywords, the remaining selection of papers was added to the review’s database of 
records obtained from search. 
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correspondence register by Baert (2018, 2020), which provided us with a comprehensive 
overview of all correspondence tests conducted since Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), 
was consulted to identify additional studies using an in-text search with a combination of 
the aforementioned keywords. Fourth, while screening the full texts of the selected studies, 
we paid attention to literature we potentially missed in the previous steps using the 
‘snowball method’, where the full text was our starting point from which relevant citations 
were extracted (Barends, Rousseau, & Briner, 2017). 
2.3. Study selection 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the study selection process. First, we excluded all duplicate 
records from the various searches, resulting in 1,029 articles. Second, the titles and abstracts 
(including keywords) were evaluated against the eligibility criteria. If the article was deemed 
relevant on the basis of the title or if the title was too ambiguous to warrant exclusion, the 
abstract was screened. In total, 919 studies were excluded in the second step, resulting in a 
subtotal of 110 research papers. Third, the full texts were assessed on the basis of the 
eligibility criteria—48 articles were eventually retained. In 62 cases, not all criteria were met, 
and the respective articles were excluded. The criteria on the basis of which studies were 
excluded were: (i) different context than the labour market (N = 26, 41.94%); (ii) no 
distinctive evidence with regard to the mechanisms of discrimination (N = 18, 29.03%); and 
(iii) no collection of quantitative data (N = 11, 17.74%). Further grounds for exclusion were 
related to the research (iv) being of secondary or qualitative nature (N = 6, 9.68%) or (v) only 
focusing on mechanisms other than taste-based or statistical discrimination (N = 1, 1.61%). 
Finally, we invited the corresponding author of each of the selected studies to validate the 
interpretation and classification (in terms of evidence of taste-based and statistical 
discrimination) of their findings as summarised in Table 2 and 3. About half of the contacted 
authors (N = 27, out of 46; 58.70%) eventually provided us with feedback.5 
<Figure 1 about here > 
Because of the vast amount of research into ethnic labour market discrimination leading 
to a large pool of studies to assess, we followed the advice of Barends et al. (2017) to have 
                                                     
5 There were 46 unique corresponding authors for the 48 studies in scope of this review.  
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a secondary reviewer perform an additional evaluation after completion of the third step of 
the study selection. The product of this review process was an inter-rater-reliability (IRR) 
estimate that captures the consensus between the primary and secondary reviewer with 
regard to the selection decisions (Hallgren, 2012). In addition, the eligibility criteria were 
refined based on the outcome of this process. To this end, we drew a random sample of 55 
studies (out of 110; 50.00%). The secondary reviewer independently assessed, without prior 
knowledge of the decisions made by the primary reviewer, whether the sampled studies 
met the inclusion criteria. In this process, the secondary reviewer (i) evaluated the title and 
the abstract of each sampled study against the criteria and (ii) re-evaluated the full texts of 
the resulting selection. We obtained an IRR estimate of .85 with an associated Kappa, a 
measure of inter-rater agreement correcting for chance, of .71 (Cohen, 1960). Based on the 
classification of Landis and Koch (1977), this estimate can be viewed as a substantial 
agreement between the raters. Between-rater disagreement was resolved (and consensus 
was reached) by a joint re-evaluation of the disputed papers. Following this process, the full 
texts of the remaining half of the papers identified after the second step of the study 
selection (N = 55) were also reassessed on the basis of the refined eligibility criteria. 
3. Results and discussion 
In the following subsections we present and discuss the findings of our review. First, we 
describe how taste-based and statistical discrimination are measured in the selected 
literature. This provides us insights into the methodological operationalisation of the 
mechanisms in ethnic labour market discrimination research. Second, we describe the 
empirical evidence of taste-based versus statistical discrimination in general. Third, we 
assess the heterogeneity in the empirical evidence by labour market outcome, region, 
minority classification and research design. 
3.1. Measurement operationalisation of the mechanisms 
Table 2 provides an overview of the various measurement operationalisations of taste-
10 
based and statistical discrimination. The classification of the included studies in terms of 
evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination is based on the interpretation of the 
findings made by the respective authors. Evidence for taste-based discrimination is 
generally measured through four operationalisations: (i) customer contact (i.e. customer 
discrimination; N = 10, out of 30; 33.33%); (ii) prejudiced views and attitudes (N = 7; 23.33%); 
(iii) similarity in characteristics (N = 6; 20.00%); and (iv) co-worker contact (i.e. employee 
discrimination; N = 4; 13.33%).6 The general hypothesis is that if one of these factors 
positively moderates the relationship between ethnicity and a specific labour market 
outcome, the result is considered to be empirical evidence in favour of taste-based 
discrimination. 
More specifically, ‘customer contact’ is assessed by looking at differences in 
discrimination between high-customer-contact and low-customer-contact jobs where 
higher discrimination rates in jobs requiring higher contact with customers are viewed as 
evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination (e.g. Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; 
Drydakis, 2012; Laouénan, 2017). In addition, ‘prejudiced views and attitudes’ are mainly 
measured by surveying said aspects (e.g. Baert & De Pauw, 2014)—yet also, for example, by 
accounting for racial animus in the form of the assignment of unpleasant tasks to workers 
(Glover, Pallais, & Pariente, 2017) or by assessing the influence of interethnic conflict on 
discriminatory conduct (Hjort, 2014). Furthermore, ‘similarity in characteristics’ is evaluated 
by measuring the association between discrimination and (i) similar personal (ethnic) 
characteristics between employees and employers (e.g. in terms of immigrant status; 
Åslund, Hensvik, & Skans, 2014); (ii) geographical or cultural distance (Boyd-Swan & Herbst, 
2019: Vernby & Dancygier, 2019); or (iii) by assessing nepotism or ethnic homophily (Barr & 
Oduro, 2002; Edo, Jacquemet, & Yannelis, 2019). Lastly, ‘co-worker contact’ is assessed by 
looking at differences in discrimination between jobs that require a considerable amount of 
contact with co-workers vis-à-vis jobs that do not (e.g. Weichselbaumer, 2017). Similar to 
the measurement operationalisation of ‘customer contact’, higher discrimination rates in 
jobs requiring higher contact with colleagues are considered as evidence for taste-based 
discrimination. 
                                                     
6 Several studies measure taste-based discrimination through different operationalisations within the same 
study, hence percentages do not add up to one—the same applies to measurement operationalisations of 
statistical discrimination. 
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Other—less frequently employed—operationalisations of taste-based discrimination 
include firm competition (N = 1, out of 30; 3.33%), economic cycle (N = 1; 3.33%), financial 
penalty (N = 1; 3.33%), firm financial health (N = 1; 3.33%) and variability in employment 
and wages (N = 1; 3.33%). In this respect, taste-based discrimination theory predicts that (i) 
discrimination is lower when (a) firm competition plays a positively moderating role, (b) 
levels of variability in employment and wages increase or (c) financial penalties for 
discriminatory conduct are imposed; (ii) discrimination is higher in times of economic 
downturn; and (iii) discrimination worsens the financial health of the firm (Asali, Pignatti, & 
Skhirtladze, 2018; Baert, De Meyer, Moerman, & Omey, 2018; Becker, 1971; Bjerk, 2007; 
Borowczyk-Martins, Bradley, & Tarasonis, 2017; Hedegaard & Tyran, 2018). 
<Table 2 about here> 
Evidence for statistical discrimination is generally measured through two 
operationalisations: (i) information (N = 22, out of 34; 64.71%) and (ii) statistical learning (N 
= 6; 17.65%). First, ‘information’ is always operationalised by adding a condition in which 
additional information is provided about language skills, academic skills or job qualifications, 
amongst other signals. Generally, it is assessed whether this condition moderates the 
relationship between ethnicity and discriminatory conduct—if discrimination is higher 
(lower) in the information condition, this is considered as evidence against (for) statistical 
discrimination (e.g. Baert et al., 2017; Blommaert, Coenders, & van Tubergen, 2014; Kaas & 
Manger, 2012; Oreopoulos, 2011; Vuolo, Lageson, & Uggen, 2017). Second, ‘statistical 
learning’ is measured by assessing whether gaining additional information about the 
experience, skills and competencies of employees over time is affiliated with differences in 
discrimination (e.g. Altonji & Pierret, 2001; Fryer, Pager, & Spenkuch, 2013). Typically, if 
levels of unequal treatment decrease over time, controlling for covariates, this is interpreted 
as evidence in favour of statistical discrimination. 
Other operationalisations of statistical discrimination are related to stereotyping (N = 2; 
5.88%), first- and second-generation minorities (N = 2, out of 34; 5.88%), firm size (N = 1; 
2.94%), selective attention (N = 1; 2.94%) and screening error (N = 1; 2.94%). In this regard, 
the authors of the respective studies hypothesised that the results are in favour of statistical 
discrimination if discrimination increases when (i) employers’ stereotypical views about 
ethnic minorities’ average performance play a positively moderating role; (ii) the minority 
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candidate is first- rather than second-generation, where one presumes that the former are 
less acquainted with the host country than the latter in terms of language and cultural 
habits, amongst other aspects; (iii) firm size increases, which presumably results in a higher 
degree of formalisation throughout the HR process and/or a higher screening capacity and 
thus in an increased capacity to acquire more (accurate) information about the minority 
applicant; (iv) employers’ diminished attention to applications from ethnic minorities plays 
a positively moderating role in the overall relationship; and (v) the variance of the screening 
error first significantly increases then decreases with employability (see e.g. Aeberhard, 
Coudin, & Rathelot, 2017; Baert & De Pauw, 2014; Baert et al., 2018; Bartoš, Bauer, 
Chytilová, & Matějka, 2016; Carlsson, 2010). 
To empirically distinguish between the taste-based and statistical discrimination 
mechanism, the included studies sometimes rely on strong assumptions in their 
measurement operationalisation.7 First, with respect to taste-based discrimination, the 
moderating effect of ‘prejudiced views and attitudes’ (or ‘stereotypical views’ when 
considering statistical discrimination) on unequal treatment is, in several cases, 
operationalised through self-report measures, as mentioned above. This is detrimental in 
the sense that respondents often display socially desirable behaviour when directly 
answering questions (related to their own attitudes and behaviour) about sensitive topics 
such as discrimination and racism (Krumpal, 2013)—this is difficult to account for a 
posteriori in the analysis of the empirical evidence of the mechanisms. Moreover, there is 
limited uniformity in the way the interaction between employer–employee similarity in 
personal characteristics and discriminatory behaviour is conceptualised. This could be on 
the basis of resemblances in ethnic or racial characteristics, but also in terms of similarities 
in geographical location or the extent to which ethnic peers are preferred over members of 
the out-group, which raises the question to what extent these operationalisations are 
conceptually valid. Second, with regard to statistical discrimination, the effect of ‘statistical 
learning’ on discrimination is generally determined by estimating differences in 
discriminatory levels over time (e.g. Epstein et al., 2016; Fryer et al., 2013; Kreisman & 
                                                     
7 This criticism is also shared by Guryan and Charles (2013), who assert that authors may claim that they 
empirically distinguish between the two mechanisms, yet for many of the studies on the mechanisms of labour 
market discrimination alternative models could generate equally convincing empirical patterns pointing in the 
opposite direction. 
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Rangel, 2015). The premise is that if the employer gradually interacts more with the minority 
employee, they gather additional (more accurate) information on the productivity of the 
minority employee, which, in turn, leads to an improvement in unequal treatment. Yet, this 
effect could also be due to the exposure itself, where the mere increase in interaction 
between employer and employee yields a decrease in discrimination (i.e. contact 
hypothesis; Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Third, looking at the differences in 
discrimination between first- and second-generation minorities, one assumes that 
employers have the unspoken perception that first-generation minorities have adapted less 
well to the host country in terms of language, culture or other related aspects (Busetta, 
Campolo, & Panarello, 2018; Carlsson, 2010). However, the results from the two included 
correspondence experiments examining this hypothesis provide no evidence for substantial 
differences in unequal treatment between these two groups, which warrants additional 
research on this research hypothesis.8 
3.2. General findings on the empirical evidence of the mechanisms 
Table 3 provides an overview of the literature assessing the empirical evidence of taste-
based and statistical labour market discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. In addition, 
Figure 2 presents descriptive statistics on the evidence regarding the mechanisms. We 
observe that 30 out of the 48 included studies (62.50%) report empirical evidence with 
regard to taste-based discrimination, of which 20 are found (out of 30; 66.67%) in favour of 
the mechanism, 8 against the mechanism (26.67%) and 2 with mixed evidence (6.67%)—the 
                                                     
8 In line with these remarks, Neumark (2018) discusses the various disadvantages of testing the empirical 
evidence of the mechanisms of labour market discrimination in greater detail—we highlight some of those 
disadvantages here. First, particularly when distinguishing between taste-based and statistical discrimination in 
nonexperimental research, one generally has to make strong assumptions on what employers already know 
about the productivity of employees—and, more importantly, what they do not know. Second, in experimental 
research in general, it is difficult to interpret studies that find little or no difference in treatment when an 
information condition is introduced. This is simply because, unless it is meticulously measured, one cannot know 
whether the additional information is used in the decision-making process or what unobserved characteristics 
are taken into account by the employer to make assumptions about the productivity of the minority employee. 
Third, while field experimental research (e.g. correspondence experiments) addresses the external validity 
problem of lab experiments—in that we can infer something about real-world effects—the frequently used ‘low-
information condition’ might not accurately reflect the actual information employers have at their disposal in 
real-life settings. 
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latter meaning that both evidence for and against the mechanism was found within the 
same study. Comparably, 34 out of the 48 included studies (70.83%) include empirical 
evidence with respect to statistical discrimination, of which 18 (out of 34; 52.94%) are in 
favour of the mechanism, 13 against (38.24%) and 3 with mixed evidence (8.82%).9 From 
this first glance at the literature, the general empirical evidence seems to favour taste-based 
discrimination rather than statistical discrimination, yet the evidence is inconsistent when 
statistically comparing inter- and intra-mechanism differences. If we compare inter-
mechanism differences via a one-tailed two-sample test of proportions, the proportion of 
evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination is not significantly greater (at the 5% 
significance level) than the proportion of evidence in favour of statistical discrimination (z = 
1.12, p = .13). In contrast, if we compare intra-mechanism differences via a one-tailed one-
sample test of proportions, the proportion of evidence in favour of taste-based 
discrimination is significantly greater than an equal proportion—here our null hypothesis is 
that half of the included studies provide supportive empirical evidence for the respective 
mechanism (z = 1.83, p = .03). If we make the same comparison regarding the evidence for 
statistical discrimination, however, the result is not statistically significant (z = .34, p = .37). 
<Figure 2 about here> 
<Table 3 about here> 
3.3. Heterogeneity of the findings 
In the following paragraphs we discuss to what extent the findings on the empirical evidence 
of taste-based and statistical discrimination are heterogenous (i.e. contextually differ) with 
respect to (i) the type of labour market outcome measure, (ii) the geographical location, (iii) 
the minority or racial group considered and (iv) the design of the research. 
                                                     
9 Several studies report empirical evidence of both taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination; 
hence frequencies do not add up to the total number of selected studies (N = 48). 
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3.3.1. By labour market outcome 
First, we consider the heterogeneity of evidence by labour market outcome.10 In the 
majority of the cases—35 out of 48 studies (72.92%)—researchers examined employment 
outcomes (i.e. recruitment and outplacement). In this respect, a wide variety of specific 
variables is assessed, ranging from employer call-back (Agan & Starr, 2018) and hiring 
intentions in Fantasy Football (Bryson & Chevalier, 2015) to unemployment rates (Combes 
et al., 2016) and the representation of minority players on NHL (National Hockey League) 
teams (Longley, 2003). Remuneration outcomes are examined in 16 papers (33.33%). In all 
cases where remuneration is assessed, wage (also operationalised as ‘earnings’, ‘salary’ or 
‘income’) or wage differentials serve as the main outcome variable (Drydakis, 2012; 
Kreisman & Rangel, 2015). Other labour market outcomes are examined in two studies 
(4.17%) and include job performance (Glover, Pallais, & Pariente, 2017) and firm 
productivity (Hjort, 2014). 
<Figure 3 about here> 
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the heterogeneity of the empirical 
evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination by labour market outcome. Research 
focusing on taste-based discrimination and in which employment outcomes are considered 
generally favour the mechanism: 16 out of 25 studies (64.00%) provide support for the taste-
based mechanism. Moreover, five out of eight studies (62.50%) that report remuneration 
outcomes provide evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination. In contrast, the 
empirical evidence is mixed with respect to statistical discrimination on the basis of 
employment outcomes: less than half of the studies (i.e. 12 out of 25; 45.83%) provide 
support for the statistical mechanism. Similar to findings on taste-based discrimination, the 
lion’s share of the studies that consider remuneration as a labour market outcome (i.e. 
seven out of 11; 63.64%) report evidence in favour of statistical discrimination. 
In addition, we discern a notable relationship between labour market outcome and 
research design: studies considering employment outcomes rely more on (quasi-
)experimental research, while studies taking into account remuneration outcomes rely more 
                                                     
10 Several studies report multiple outcomes; hence frequencies do not add up to the total number of selected 
studies (N = 48). 
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on correlational research. The majority of studies (17 out of 25; 68.00%) reporting evidence 
on taste-based discrimination on the basis of employment outcomes are built on a (quasi-
)experimental research design. We observe a similar pattern for 22 out of 24 studies 
(91.67%) reporting evidence on statistical discrimination—this includes all 12 studies 
reporting evidence against the mechanism. In contrast, remuneration is mostly measured 
via correlational research: six out of eight studies (75.00%) reporting evidence on taste-
based discrimination on the basis of remuneration outcomes and nine out of 11 studies 
(81.82%) reporting evidence on statistical discrimination depend on this design. Moreover, 
we observe that (quasi-)experimental research produces more empirical evidence against 
the mechanisms, in particular with respect to statistical discrimination, while the opposite 
applies to correlational research (see Subsection 3.3.4). The logic behind these findings 
becomes apparent when examining the inverse relationship—all (field) experimental studies 
in scope of this review take into account employment outcomes. This is a rational 
consequence of the dominance of the correspondence testing method, which is generally 
used in labour market discrimination research that focuses on employer call-back and hiring 
intentions (i.e. the initial phase of the personnel selection process; Baert, 2018; Gaddis, 
2018; Guryan & Charles, 2013; Neumark, 2018). 
3.3.2. By region 
Next, we consider the heterogeneity of the evidence by region. To facilitate interpretation, 
the regions are pooled in three broadly defined categories: ‘Europe’, ‘The Americas’ and 
‘Other’. In the majority of the studies, that is in 25 out of 48 studies (54.17%), the analysis is 
based on European data, of which ten (out of 25) on Western European (40.00%), six on 
Northern European (24.00%), five on Central European (20.00%), two on Southern 
European (8.00%) and one on Eastern European (4.00%) data. In addition, one study is based 
on data from various European Union countries (4.00%). In 20 out of 48 studies (41.67%), 
the analysis depends on (North) American data. More specifically, data from the USA (United 
States of America) is the base for this research in 18 cases (90.00%), while the analysis 
depends on Canadian data twice (10.00%; of which one time in combination with data from 
the USA). Finally, with respect to the remaining three out of 48 studies (6.25%), two are 
based on African and one on Middle Eastern data. 
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<Figure 4 about here> 
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the heterogeneity of the empirical 
evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination by region. The evidence regarding 
taste-based discrimination is generally mixed in research on European data (i.e. ten out of 
18 studies report evidence in favour of the mechanism; 55.55%), while it predominantly 
supports the mechanism in research on American data (i.e. nine studies out of 11 in total; 
81.82%). This also applies to evidence regarding statistical discrimination: in research on 
European data, ten out of 20 studies (50.00%) are in favour of the statistical mechanism 
while, in the Americas, seven out of 12 studies (58.33%) report supportive evidence. 
Although we cannot rule out the role of contextual differences between Europe and the 
Americas, in particular North America, it appears that the relationship between region and 
research design plays a part in these results—similar to the findings on the heterogeneity of 
the evidence by labour market outcome.11 The majority of studies relying on European data 
(15 out of 18; 83.33%) and reporting evidence on taste-based discrimination are based on a 
(quasi-)experimental research design. We observe comparable findings (17 out of 20 
studies; 85.00%) with regard to statistical discrimination. In contrast, studies relying on 
American data reporting evidence on taste-based discrimination are mostly based on 
correlational research (eight out of 11 studies; 72.73%), while six out of 12 studies (50.00%) 
reporting evidence on statistical discrimination are built on said design. Again, we note that 
(quasi-)experimental research seems to produce more empirical evidence against taste-
based and statistical discrimination, while correlational research appears to generate more 
empirical evidence in favour of the mechanisms (see Subsection 3.3.4). This at least partially 
explains the heterogeneity of the empirical evidence by region. 
3.3.3. By minority classification 
Subsequently, we consider the heterogeneity of the evidence by minority classification. Also 
here, to facilitate interpretation, ethnic minorities are pooled into five more broadly defined 
                                                     
11 For example, the extensive flexibility of the US job market in terms of securing employment-related rights (i.e. 
employment at will) differs from the more relationship-based approach in Western Europe (McCall & Werhane, 
2009). Several scholars argue that the wide discretion that comes with the employment at will doctrine facilitates 
discriminatory conduct, which employers can get away with even if the unequal treatment is based on distaste 
or other, seemingly eligible, reasons (Suk, 2007). 
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categories: ‘Various Origins’, ‘Black’, ‘Asian’, ‘African’ and ‘Other’. This categorisation is 
based on the United Nations’ M49 Standard for nationality (United Nations, 2020) or the 
authors’ own classification when considering race and religion. The ‘Other’ category 
comprises the groups that are examined in only one of the included studies, namely whites, 
Europeans, Muslims and Americans. Blacks appear as the racial minority group in 14 out of 
48 studies (29.17%). This proportion is identical to the selection of studies in which 
minorities of various origins are included. With regard to the latter, Åslund, Hensvik and 
Skans (2014), for example, evaluated differences in hiring rates and wages between native 
Swedes and Nordic, Western, Eastern European, Former Yugoslavian, Latin American, Asian, 
African as well as Middle Eastern minorities. Furthermore, both Africans and Asians are 
observed as minorities in eight studies (16.67%), while other minorities are considered in 
four studies (8.33%). 
<Figure 5 about here> 
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the heterogeneity of the empirical 
evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination by minority classification. The 
variability across classifications makes it difficult to uncover clear patterns. However, we 
observe two notable results. First, research in which various ethnic minority groups are 
taken into account generally produces empirical evidence against the mechanisms: in five 
out of ten (50.00%) and seven out of 11 studies (63.64%), the authors argued against taste-
based and statistical discrimination, respectively. Second, research in which Africans or 
blacks serve as the racial minority group mainly generates evidence in favour of taste-based 
and statistical discrimination. In line with our findings regarding heterogeneity by labour 
market outcome and region, we observe a similar relationship between minority 
classification and research design. More specifically, 11 out of 14 (78.57%) studies that take 
into account minorities of various nationalities are based on (quasi-)experimental research 
(which seemingly produces more evidence against the mechanisms), while 14 out of 22 
studies (63.64%) focusing on blacks and Africans are based on correlational research (which 
seemingly generates more evidence in favour of the mechanisms; see Subsection 3.3.4). 
3.3.4. By research design 
Finally, we consider the heterogeneity of the evidence by research design. We look at three 
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broad categories: ‘experimental’, ‘correlational’ and ‘quasi-experimental’. Half of the 
studies (24 out of 48; 50.00%), use an experimental design to examine the empirical 
evidence regarding the mechanisms of discrimination—this is generally in the form of a field 
experiment. The second most frequently used design is correlational research, as is the case 
in 21 studies (43.75%). Only three studies (6.25%) implement a quasi-experimental design, 
either in the form of an N-RCT (non-randomized, controlled, before-after study; e.g. Bryson 
& Chevalier, 2015) or by combing an N-RCT with observational data (e.g. Glover et al., 2017). 
<Figure 6 about here> 
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the heterogeneity of the empirical 
evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination by research design. We discover a 
congruent pattern when examining differences with respect to taste-based discrimination. 
With the exception of a few studies that use a quasi-experimental design, similar shares of 
experimental (11 out of 16; 68.75%) and correlational research (eight out of 11; 72.73%) 
report evidence in favour of the taste-based mechanism. Conversely, 12 out of 21 studies 
(57.14%) that are based on experimental research provide evidence against statistical 
discrimination, while eight out of 11 studies (72.73%) that are based on correlational 
research support said mechanism. As mentioned in Subsection 3.3.1, experimental research 
on labour market discrimination typically focuses on the first step of the selection process, 
sometimes referred to as ‘resume screening’, using the correspondence testing method 
(Derous, Ryan, & Nguyen, 2012; Gaddis, 2018). It appears that research based on this 
method (and more broadly experimental research) provides more evidence in favour of 
taste-based as opposed to statistical discrimination. If we compare inter-mechanism 
differences via a one-tailed two-sample test of proportions, the proportion of experimental 
evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination is significantly greater than the 
corresponding proportion in favour of statistical discrimination (z = 1.85, p = .03). In contrast, 
except for two studies that report mixed evidence regarding statistical discrimination, there 
are no substantial between-mechanism differences when considering correlational 
research. This heterogenous finding and the fact that one is able to draw causal inference 
from experimental labour market discrimination research suggests that ethnic 
discrimination in hiring might be better explained by taste-based discrimination rather than 
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statistical discrimination (Guryan & Charles, 2013; Leary, 2012; Neumark, 2018).12 
4. Conclusion 
In this review, we charted the recent ethnic labour market discrimination literature that 
confronts the theories of tasted-based and statistical discrimination against the empirical 
reality. Following the classic structure of a systematic review, we used various search 
methods to identify peer-reviewed articles published between 2000 and 2019 that assessed 
the empirical evidence on the mechanisms of ethnic labour market discrimination. Next, we 
made a selection of these articles, focusing on the following eligibility criteria: (i) primary, 
empirical, quantitatively-oriented research with a (quasi–)experimental, field experimental 
or (regression-based) correlational research design; (ii) studies considering minorities who 
are discriminated against on the basis of their ethnicity; and (iii) studies evaluating 
differential treatment in terms of labour market outcomes such as employment and 
remuneration. Finally, we surveyed three main aspects of the included studies: (i) the 
measurement operationalisation of the discrimination mechanisms; (ii) the general findings 
on the quantitative, empirical evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination; and (iii) 
the heterogeneity of these findings by (a) the labour market outcome in scope of the 
selected studies, (b) the region of data collection, (c) the adopted minority classification and 
(d) the research design used. Based on the eligibility criteria, articles solely focusing on 
qualitative research methods were not included in the review. Nevertheless, we recognise 
that this type of research may be suitable for assessing the root cause of discriminatory 
behaviour, too, and could provide us with equally interesting insights (see e.g. Midtbøen, 
2014; Pager & Karafin, 2009). In addition to the analyses we have presented here, we 
therefore suggest future research to compile an overview of the evidence from qualitative 
research on the mechanisms of ethnic labour market discrimination. 
                                                     
12 Neumark (2018) rightly notes that correlational research often relies on regression-based methods that cannot 
fully control for all relevant covariates (i.e. productivity-related characteristics). Therefore, it is difficult to 
establish causal relationships in this type of research. Covariates can also reflect feedback effects (e.g. ethnic 
minorities having less work experience because they are discriminated against) which can result in understating 
discrimination. 
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 First, the measurement operationalisations appeared to vary greatly between the 
included studies. On the one hand, taste-based discrimination was generally operationalised 
by examining the moderation effect on unequal treatment of (i) increased contact between 
ethnic minorities and their colleagues from the majority group and customers of the firm 
(i.e. employee and customer discrimination); (ii) employer–employee similarity in terms of 
personal characteristics; or (iii) self-reported prejudiced views and attitudes. On the other 
hand, statistical discrimination was typically operationalised by (i) assessing differences in 
levels of discrimination between high- and a low-information conditions or (ii) evaluating 
the effects of statistical learning (i.e. the acquisition of additional information on individual 
employees over time) on unequal treatment. These different operationalisations identified 
in the selection of studies bring about major limitations, however. Because there was very 
limited consistency in measurement operationalisation, it was difficult to statistically 
compare the evidence between the studies. Beyond the discrepancies in research design, 
this was one of the reasons why meta-analytical methods were not used to analyse the 
empirical evidence of the mechanisms. Moreover, several studies relied on strong 
assumptions in their measurement operationalisation. For example, most of the research 
providing evidence for statistical discrimination on the basis of statistical learning depended 
on the premise that employers gain information on the individual-level productivity of 
employees over time and will subsequently act on this information, hence reducing unequal 
treatment. In contrast, an equally plausible explanation, in line with the contact hypothesis 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), is that the mere exposure to interaction with ethnic minorities 
could (also) lead to less discrimination. In se, distinct yet closely related measurement 
operationalisations of discrimination mechanisms can coexist as long as they produce 
empirical evidence based on theoretically valid assumptions and do so in a reliable, 
consistent manner. However, whereas the correspondence testing method has become the 
standard in examining the incidence of labour market discrimination, we count on future 
research efforts focusing directly on differentiating between the mechanisms of (ethnic) 
labour market discrimination to ultimately converge into a ‘golden’ measurement standard 
for evaluating the empirical evidence of said mechanisms. 
Second, the empirical evidence of taste-based and statistical discrimination appeared to 
be somewhat mixed. A majority of the included studies provided empirical evidence for both 
taste-based as well as statistical discrimination. In this respect, we did not find a statistically 
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significant difference when comparing the proportion of evidence in favour of the taste-
based mechanism with the proportion of evidence in favour of the statistical mechanism. 
However, the proportion of evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination was 
significantly greater than an equal proportion—in which our null hypothesis was that half of 
the studies examining empirical evidence on the mechanism support it—while the result 
was statistically insignificant when considering statistical discrimination. These findings 
indicate that there is a discrepancy in the prevalence of the evidence on economic 
discrimination mechanisms, suggesting ethnic labour market discrimination cannot be fully 
explained by either mechanism in itself. 
Finally, narrowing in on the heterogeneity of the empirical evidence, we observed the 
following: (i) research focusing on employment outcomes (e.g. employer call-back, hiring 
intentions or unemployment rates) as the outcome variable provided more evidence in 
favour of the taste-based mechanism; (ii) research on North American data typically 
produced evidence in favour of both mechanisms, while the evidence produced by research 
on European data was generally mixed; (iii) studies in which the minority classification 
comprised several minorities of various origins yielded more evidence against both 
mechanisms; and (iv) research based on an experimental research design provided more 
evidence for taste-based discrimination and against statistical discrimination. In addition to 
the latter, we observed a notable relationship between the research design of the selected 
studies and the other three aspects by which heterogeneity was assessed: studies that (i) 
focused on employment outcomes (i.e. recruitment and, to a minor extent, outplacement), 
(ii) were administered in a European context or (iii) included several minorities of different 
origins in their design were typically based on experimental research. Together with the fact 
that most (field) experimental research enables us to make causal inferences, the above 
findings suggest that ethnic discrimination in hiring may be better explained by taste-based 
discrimination vis-à-vis statistical discrimination. Therefore, a key policy implication from 
our review seems to be that—rather than requiring applicants to provide additional 
information signalling their skills, knowledge or competence—increasing the price of hiring 
discrimination against ethnic minorities is expected to reduce this unequal treatment. 
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Figure 1. Flow chart of the study selection 
 
Notes. Figure adapted from Moher et al. (2009, p. 267). 
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Figure 2. Comparison of the studies assessing the empirical evidence regarding taste-based and statistical 
labour market discrimination on the basis of ethnicity 
 
Notes. Numbers in the stacked bars are frequencies.  
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Figure 3. Heterogeneity of the empirical evidence by labour market outcome of taste-based and statistical 




Figure 4. Heterogeneity of the empirical evidence by region of taste-based and statistical labour market 




Figure 5. Heterogeneity of the empirical evidence by minority classification of taste-based and statistical 




Figure 6. Heterogeneity of the empirical evidence by research design of taste-based and statistical labour 









Sample I: Ethnic/racial minorities (in comparison with ethnic/racial majorities). E: Minorities who are 
discriminated against on the basis of other (legal) grounds than ethnicity or race. 
Phenomenon of 
Interest 
I: The economic mechanisms of labour market discrimination most firmly rooted in economic 
theory: taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination. E: Other, (non-)economic 
mechanisms and theories of discrimination. 
Design I: (Quasi-)experiments, field experiments and (regression-based) correlational research. E: meta-
analyses, (systematic) reviews, case studies, interview-type studies and theoretical papers. 
Evaluation 
(Outcome) 
I: Differential treatment in terms of labour market outcomes, such as employment, employee 
productivity, remuneration, work conditions and outplacement. E: Studies solely focusing on 
outcomes related to other markets, such as the product, service, retail or real estate market. 
Research type I: Primary, quantitative, empirical research (including mixed methods). E: Secondary and 
qualitative research. 
Notes. ‘I’ denotes ‘inclusion’. ‘E’ denotes ‘exclusion’. The SPIDER-framework presented here is based on Cooke, 
Smith, and Booth (2012). 
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A. Taste-Based Discrimination 
Co-worker contact Differences in discrimination between high- and 
low-contact jobs with regard to co-workers. 
Weichselbaumer (2017) assessed whether the unfavourable treatment was due to co-worker 
preferences by introducing a ‘team contact’ variable which captured whether the interaction 
with co-workers was explicitly mentioned in the job advertisement. The results show that 
discrimination does not vary by team contact. The author interpreted this as evidence against 
employee discrimination (i.e. taste-based discrimination). 
Customer contact Differences in discrimination between high- and 
low-contact jobs with regard to customers. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) assessed the relationship between different job types (i.e. 
administrative jobs and sales jobs) and discrimination. They did not find higher discrimination 
levels in high-contact jobs, which they considered evidence against customer discrimination (i.e. 
taste-based discrimination). 
Economic cycle Discrimination moderated by economic cycle (e.g. 
economic downturn). 
Asali, Pignatti, and Skhirtladze (2018) found that hiring discrimination was positively moderated 
by the effects of economic downturn, which is in line with predictions of Becker’s (1971) taste-
based discrimination theory. 
Financial penalty Differences in discrimination when discriminatory 
conducted is financially penalised. 
Hedegaard and Tyran (2018) found that discriminatory conduct diminished when the price of 
doing so increased (in the form of a financial penalty). 
Firm competition Discrimination moderated by competition 
between firms. 
Bjerk’s (2007) evaluated whether firm competition, related to competition for high-skilled 
talent, mitigated discrimination in the white-collar sector. His findings show that this 
relationship exists, which is in line with the predictions of Becker (1971) based on taste-based 
discrimination theory and hence provides support for the taste-based mechanism. 
Firm financial health Discrimination yields difference in financial health 
of the firm. 
Baert, De Meyer, Moerman, and Omey (2018) evaluated the relationship between the financial 
health of the firm and hiring discrimination. In contrast to predictions from taste-based 
discrimination theory, the results indicate that unequal treatment does not yield worse financial 
health for the firm. 
Prejudiced views and 
attitudes 
Differences in discrimination because of 
differences in views or attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities. 
Baert and De Pauw (2014) linked the outcome of a vignette experiment with survey questions 
regarding potentially prejudiced views of the participants vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. They found 
that the views negatively mediated the relationship between ethnic origin and the likelihood of 





Differences in discrimination due to (perceived) 
similarity (e.g. candidates sharing overt 
characteristics with employer), nepotism, ethnic 
homophily, physical distance (e.g. location) or 
cultural distance. 
Boyd-Swan and Herbst (2019) evaluated the relationship between ethnicity, hiring chances and 
neighbourhood composition on the basis of ethnicity. The results indicate that racial and ethnic 
shares (in neighbourhoods) correlate with hiring decisions, benefitting applicants from the most 
strongly represented ethnic group. This was interpreted as evidence in favour of the taste-
based mechanism. 
Variability in 
employment and wages 
Discrimination moderated by variability in wage. Borowczyk-Martins, Bradley, and Tarasonis (2017) found that, in line with predictions of 
Becker’s (1971) model of taste-based discrimination, the lower employment chances and wages 
of black workers vis-à-vis white workers varied less when looking at jobs requiring higher skills. 
B. Statistical Discrimination 
Firm size Discrimination moderated by the size of the firm. Baert, De Meyer, Moerman, and Omey (2018) hypothesised that larger firms tend to 
discriminate less than smaller firms as having a dedicated, formalised human resources 
department and a greater capacity to process applications leads to being able to acquire more 
accurate information about job applicants. The results show no relationship between firm size 
and hiring discrimination, unlike predictions based on statistical discrimination theory. 
First- and second-
generation minorities 
Differences in discrimination as a consequence of 
perceived dissimilarity in skills or competencies 
(e.g. language skills or educational attainment) 
between first- and second-generation minorities. 
Carlsson (2010) hypothesised that first-generation immigrants would have lower chances of 
receiving job interview invitations vis-à-vis second-generation immigrants because of perceived 
dissimilarity in language and educational skills. In contrast to predictions from statistical 
discrimination, they found that first- and second-generation immigrants had similar 
probabilities of being invited to a job interview, albeit lower than native candidates. 
Information Discrimination moderated by an information 
condition related to employee productivity (e.g. 
personality, language skills, criminal history, 
academic skills and job qualifications). 
Kaas and Manger (2012) assessed the relationship between ethnicity, employer call-back and 
the inclusion of additional information about the candidates. The findings suggest that the 
inclusion of a reference letter that stated favourable information about minority candidates’ 
personality positively moderates the negative relationship between ethnicity and employer call-
back, which is evidence in favour of statistical discrimination. 
Selective attention Differences in discrimination due to a lack of 
attention or selective attention. 
Bartoš, Bauer, Chytilová, and Matějka (2016) found that employers paid less attention to 
applications from minorities than majorities in the Czech and German labour market, which 
they labelled ‘attention discrimination’. The uncovered discrimination is in line with statistical 
discrimination theory that puts forward information asymmetry, which the authors explained 
through selective attention to particular information. 
Screening error Differences in discrimination due to variation in 
screening error. 
Aeberhardt, Coudin, and Rathelot (2017) found heterogeneity in terms of hiring and exit rates 
on the basis of ethnicity. The ethnic disparity in exit rates presumably occurred due to the 
differing variance of the screening error across ethnic groups. The authors attributed the latter 
to the mechanism of statistical discrimination. 
Statistical learning Discrimination moderated by acquiring additional Altonji and Pierret (2001) found that work experience is related to racial differences in wages. 
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information about employee work experience, 
skills and competencies. 
As employers learn about the productivity of their employees, the wage gap rises. However, the 
rate of increase falls when skill measures are controlled for. Therefore, they concluded that, at 
best, employers only partially statistically discriminate on the basis of race, which is interpreted 
as evidence against statistical discrimination. 
Stereotyping Differences in discrimination due to stereotypical 
views. 
Glover, Pallais, and Pariente (2017) found that implicitly biased managers had certain 
stereotypes related to (the confidence in) the abilities of ethnic minorities, which fostered 
ethnic discrimination. They interpreted this as evidence in favour of statistical discrimination. 
Notes. The third column ‘Illustration’ reflects the classification with regard to the empirical evidence on taste-based and statistical discrimination made by the respective authors 
on the grounds of their research findings. 
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Main findings related to the mechanisms 
A. Employment 




3,626 French males with 
parents of North African 




The results indicate that hiring rates rise with observed worker qualifications 
(employability) and decrease upon reaching a certain threshold, which 
matches the predictions of a static model of statistical discrimination. In 
addition, exit rates increase with employability and vary on the basis of 
ethnicity. This ethnic disparity in exit rates presumably occurs if the variance 
of the screening error (i.e. a ‘noisier’ signal) differs across ethnic groups. Both 
findings provide evidence in favour of statistical discrimination (+). 
Agan and Starr 
(2018) 
North America 
(United States of 
America) 
7,320 fictitious black 




The results show that ban-the-box measures in the USA substantially decrease 
employer call-back for black applicants vis-à-vis white applicants. Because 
employers no longer possess information about the applicants’ criminal 
history, they are forced to rely on (minority) group-level information, which is 
detrimental for black applicants. This is evidence in line with statistical 
discrimination (+).m 
Asali et al. (2018) Eastern Europe 
(Georgia) 
1,100 fictitious Azerbaijani and 




Georgian applicants are more than twice as likely to be called back for a job 
interview than equally skilled Azerbaijani or Armenian applicants. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that this discrimination tends to increase 
during economic busts as labour demand decreases. This is in line with 
predictions from taste-based discrimination (+).n 




Middle Eastern immigrants 
(other immigrants with an 
ethnic background different 




Due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks that took place in the USA, the authors 
expected a deterioration of employment perspectives for immigrants as a 
consequence of increased negative attitudes towards them. Although the 
results indicate that there is evidence of a change in attitudes, they do not 
show said effect exists and thus contradict taste-based discrimination (−) as a 
possible explanation for discrimination. 




139 fictitious applicants with a 
Turkish-sounding name (139 
applicants with a Flemish-
sounding name) 
Experimental 
(lab, incl. survey 
data) 
The findings indicate that views related to the mechanism of taste-based 
discrimination mediate the relationship between the applicant being of non-
native origin and an invitation to a job interview. The overall mediation effect 
is negative, which provides evidence for the presence of taste-based 
discrimination (+). This does not hold true for attitudes related to the 
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mechanism of statistical discrimination (−), for which no effect is found. 
Baert et al. (2017) Western Europe 
(Belgium) 
384 fictitious applicants with a 
Turkish, Moroccan, Slovakian 
or Ghanaian name (384 




The results show that work experience lowers hiring discrimination against 
immigrants. Because more information about the actual productivity of a job 
candidate increases with work experience (i.e. decreased information 
asymmetry) negatively relates to the uncovered discrimination, these results 
are in line with statistical discrimination (+). 
Baert et al. (2018) Western Europe 
(Belgium) 
337 fictitious applicants with a 
Turkish, Moroccan, Slovakian 
or Ghanaian name (337 






The findings provide evidence against statistical discrimination (−) and taste-
based discrimination (−). On the one hand, from the perspective of statistical 
discrimination, larger firms potentially discriminate less than smaller firms, as 
they have a dedicated, formalised human resources department, greater 
capacity to process applications, and hence possess more accurate 
information of job applicants. On the other hand, taste-based discrimination 
suggests that unequal treatment based on prejudice should yield worse firm 
financial health. The results show no significant relationship between firm size 
or financial health and hiring discrimination. 
Bartoš et al. (2016) Central Europe 
(Czech Republic, 
Germany) 
653 fictitious candidates with 
an Asian or Roma name (640 




The results indicate that employers discriminate due to a lack of attention to 
certain information or ‘willingness to process information’, and hence choose 
to pay less attention to applications from minorities (i.e. attention 
discrimination). This, in turn, relates to statistical discrimination as 
information asymmetry is detrimental to the hiring chances of minorities. The 
authors argue that the evidence is in line with statistical discrimination (+) but 





(United States of 
America) 
2,435 fictitious black 




The results indicate that there is no evidence that discrimination is higher for 
jobs requiring greater communication skills vis-à-vis customers and co-
workers, which contradicts taste-based discrimination (−). Discrimination levels 
also do not increase when credentials become more apparent, hence 
statistical discrimination (−) is unlikely to explain the call-back rate 
differentials. The authors argue that alternative models may better explain 
their findings. 




318 fictitious Arabic-named 




On the one hand, the results show that Arabic-named applicants experience 
substantial discrimination in the first ‘view’ phase of selection, in which 
employers decide on which candidates’ full resumés to view. On the other 
hand, controlling for the number of views, discrimination decreases in the 
second ‘call-back’ phase. However, the degree of discrimination does not vary 
across occupational levels and sectors, and ethnic minorities do not receive 
lower returns to informative, observable, productivity-related characteristics 
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(United States of 
America) 
Fictitious applicants with 
black- and Hispanic-sounding 




The results indicate that neighbourhood racial and ethnic shares (i.e. proxy for 
customer discrimination) correlate with teacher hiring decisions in child care 
centres, benefitting applicant-teachers in neighbourhoods where their own 
ethnicity is more strongly represented (i.e. ethnic homophily). This is evidence 





642 non-white Fantasy 
Football players (1,125 white 




The results provide little evidence for racial discrimination in the virtual labour 
market of Fantasy Football. The virtual labour market setting rules out taste-
based discrimination (−) since the players do not physically play together 
(there is no interaction), the employers have no customers and most 
endogenous and exogenous factors are identical by design. Furthermore, 
employers have perfect knowledge of the Fantasy Football players’ labour 
productivity. However, the results do show discrimination in hiring and firing 
of new players for whom, exceptionally, no productivity information is 
available at the start of the football season, hinting that statistical 
discrimination (+) might be at play. 
Busetta et al. (2018) Southern Europe 
(Italy) 
20,000 fictitious first- and 
second-generation immigrants 
with an ethnic background 
(2,000 native Italians) 
Experimental 
(field) 
First-generation immigrants are presumed to be less integrated in society 
than second-generation immigrants due to being viewed as less proficient in 
Italian and less educated. Notwithstanding the hypothesised language 
proficiency differences, the results show that there is no significant difference 
in the hiring chances of first- and second-generation immigrants in Italy. These 
findings contradict statistical discrimination (−). Alternatively, the authors 
suggest that the most valid explanation for the uncovered discrimination is 
taste-based discrimination (+). 
Carlsson (2010) Northern Europe 
(Sweden) 
1,295 fictitious first-
generation and 1,337 second-
generation Middle Eastern 




The results indicate that first- and second-generation immigrants have 
essentially the same probability of being invited to a job interview. This 
suggests that minority applicants with a Middle Eastern background are 
discriminated against because of their ethnicity. This is evidence in line with 
taste-based discrimination (+) and contradicts statistical discrimination (−). Yet, 
the results also indicate that employment agencies are more likely to invite 
minority candidates than other firms, potentially because of better 
assessment procedures and/or compliance with anti-discrimination 
legislation. This is evidence in favour of statistical discrimination (+). 




2,820 fictitious applicants with 
a typical Middle Eastern name 
Experimental 
(field, incl. 
The results show that applicants with a Middle Eastern name are 
discriminated against to a larger extent than applicants with a typically 
47 
(2,837 applicants with a 
typical Swedish name) 
administrative 
data) 
Swedish name in municipalities where people, on average, have more 
negative attitudes towards immigrants—this effect is greater for low-skilled 
occupations. These results are evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination 
(+). 




137,801 African immigrants 
(3,169,975 French natives) 
Correlational 
(cross-sectional) 
The results show that African immigrants are underrepresented in jobs that 
require a substantial amount of customer contact in the French labour 
market, and that this discrimination is linked with customer behaviour. This 
evidence is in line with taste-based discrimination (+), and more specifically 
customer discrimination. 
Edo et al. (2019) Western Europe 
(France) 
2,012 fictitious applicants with 
North African- and other 
foreign-sounding names 




The results suggest that hiring discrimination against ethnic minorities as well 
as ethnic homophily (by natives and females) in hiring practices exists in the 
French labour market. The latter is evidence in favour of taste-based 
discrimination (+). The results also show that differences in call-back become 
statistically insignificant for non-French females when additional information 
(i.e. inclusion signals) is provided, yet this does not affect discrimination 
against non-French males. Given the intersectionality with gender, the results 
thus provide partial evidence with regard to statistical discrimination (+). 





388,820 recent immigrants in 
the EU and 719,388 




The results support the premise that regional ethnic diversity positively 
impacts the employment perspectives of immigrants. This effect is stronger 
for high-skilled immigrants than low-skilled immigrants as well as for recent 
immigrants than for established immigrants. This is evidence in favour of 
statistical discrimination (+) because information asymmetry presumably 
decreases in ethnically diverse regions, positively impacting employment 
rates. 




528 fictitious internship 
candidates with Turkish-
sounding name (528 fictitious 




The findings of a correspondence test suggest that an employer’s call-back is 
significantly lower for applicants with a Turkish-sounding name than for 
applicants with a German-sounding name. The call-back rate increases (and 
the difference becomes insignificant) when applications of candidates with a 
Turkish-sounding name are accompanied by a reference letter stating 
additional favourable information about the candidate’s personality. Overall, 
these results provide evidence for statistical discrimination (+). 




5,819 fictitious German ethnic 
minority candidates of 
Turkish, Bosnian, Polish, 
Russian or Italian descent, 
amongst others (5,819 
Experimental 
(field) 
On the one hand, the results indicate that the greater the cultural value 
distance (from the majority culture), the higher the rate of hiring 
discrimination against ethnic minorities. On the other hand, the results fail to 
confirm that average group levels of education explain the group differences 
in call-back ratios: when value distance patterns are controlled for, 
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German natives) discrimination is no longer statistically significant. This evidence is in favour of 
taste-based discrimination (+) but against statistical discrimination (−). 
Laouénan (2017) North America 






The results indicate that African-Americans are discriminated against in the 
USA labour market in terms of overall employment opportunities and 
opportunities to attain jobs with high customer contact. This is evidence in 
favour of taste-based discrimination (+) and, more specifically, customer 
discrimination. 
Longley (2003) North America 
(United States of 
America, Canada) 
French Canadians (English 
Canadians and Americans)d 
Correlational 
(panel) 
The results show that French Canadians are less likely to be employed by an 
NHL team based in English Canada than an NHL team based in the United 
States. The author argues that the difference in team location (English Canada 
vs. USA) is a proxy for fan prejudice, and that its relation to the representation 
of French Canadians on a team is evidence for customer discrimination. The 
results support the customer discrimination hypothesis; hence, they provide 
evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination (+). 




240 fictitious candidates with 
African, Asian or German 




Candidates with Irish-sounding names are over twice as likely to be called 
back for an interview vis-à-vis candidates with an African-, Asian- or German-
sounding name. The authors argue that, because discrimination does not 
increase in sales jobs where levels of customer contact are higher than in 
other jobs (implying customer discrimination) or lower in accountancy jobs for 
which formal qualifications are presumably more important than for other 
jobs (implying statistical discrimination), neither taste-based discrimination (−) 
nor statistical discrimination (−) provide an explanation for the discriminatory 
conduct. 
Nunley et al. (2016) North America 
(United States of 
America) 
4,698 fictitious black 




The results indicate that black-named applicants are less likely than white-
named applicants to receive interview requests from employers. Moreover, 
the results show that the racial gap in employment opportunities widens with 
perceived productivity characteristics (business degree, internship, in-field 
experience) and that the differential treatment by race is greater for jobs that 
require customer interaction. The former contradicts statistical discrimination 
(−); the latter is evidence in favour of taste-based discrimination (+) and, more 
specifically, customer discrimination. 
Oreopoulos (2011) North America 
(Canada) 
9,884 fictitious candidates 
with Indian, Pakistani, Chinese 
or Greek names (3,026 




The author argues that, under the model of statistical discrimination, the 
impact of listing language fluency is greater for applicants with an ethnic 
background than for natives. However, the findings suggest that recruiters do 
not behave consistently, which is evidence against statistical discrimination (−), 
because they attribute their discriminatory behaviour to language skill 
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concerns but fail to fully account for offsetting features when listed. 
Ritter and Taylor 
(2011) 
North America 
(United States of 
America) 




The results, presented in an agency-based model of unemployment, show 
that black and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic workers experience higher lifetime 
unemployment than white workers with similar (pre-market) skills. The 
authors suggest that day-to-day work-related miscommunication might 
explain the higher unemployment for minority workers, for which they 
provide some direct evidence. Following Lang (1986), the results hint at 
workplace segregation, which can be viewed as evidence for taste-based 
discrimination (+). 
Uggen et al. (2014) North America 
(United States of 
America) 
153 fictitious African-




The results show that African-Americans are called back less frequently by 
employers, especially when reporting a misdemeanour arrest during the hiring 
process. Furthermore, the results indicate that personal contact with 
applicants has a strong positive effect on call-back rates. The authors suggest 
that, in the absence of contact, employers erroneously attribute a lower 
productivity to minority applicants, while the additional information they 
receive when interacting with them decreases discriminatory conduct. The 





1,492 fictitious Polish, Iraqi 
and Somalian candidates 
(1,492 Swedish candidates) 
Experimental 
(field) 
The authors make use of ethno-cultural distance vis-à-vis Swedish nationals as 
a proxy for racial prejudice. The findings indicate that call-back rates for 
candidates with an ethnic background decline with increased distance across 
minority groups, especially if the candidates are male. This is evidence in 
favour of taste-based discrimination (+). Adopting citizenship, acquiring work 
experience or signalling religious practice have little effect on employment 
chances, which is evidence against statistical discrimination (−). 
Vuolo et al. (2017) North America 
(United States of 
America) 
605 fictitious black applicants 
(605 white applicants) 
Experimental 
(field) 
Call-back rates for black applicants are compared across those receiving a 
question about their criminal record and answer it negatively (i.e. having no 
criminal record) and those who did not receive a question. The results suggest 
that there exists a difference between both groups, whereby applicants who 
receive and answer the question witness a higher call-back rate. The authors 
suggest that statistical discrimination (+) might play a role in the likelihood of a 





1,237 fictitious Serbian, 
Turkish, Chinese and Nigerian 




The results indicate that there is discrimination against applicants of different 
origins. The author argues that the discrimination is unlikely due to statistical 
discrimination (−) because minority applicants are at par with majority 
candidates with regard to schooling and language proficiency and have 
provide extensive personal information on their resumés. Moreover, 
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discriminatory levels do not vary by characteristics that relate to customer or 
co-worker interactions, which contradicts taste-based discrimination (−). 
Alternatively, the author argues that employer preferences are most probably 
at the root of the uncovered discrimination, which hints at taste-based 
discrimination (+) as the underlying mechanism. 
B. Remuneration 
Altonji and Pierret 
(2001) 
North America 
(United States of 
America) 
863 young black US men 
(2,113 young white US men) 
Correlational 
(panel) 
The results show that the unexplained race gap is small at low experience 
levels and that the gap rises with experience. In addition, the results indicate 
that the rate of increase is reduced when interactions between experience 
and skill measures, which are both hard to observe and negatively correlated 
with race, are also controlled for. This pattern and other results are more 
consistent with the conclusion that employers only make partial use of race as 
information when assessing workers, which is interpreted as evidence against 
statistical discrimination (−). The authors cannot rule out, however, that firms 
might partially statistically discriminate on the basis of race. 
Barr and Oduro 
(2002) 
West Africa (Ghana) 1,045 Ghanaian workers with 




The results suggest that Ghanaian production workers are remunerated 
differently depending on their ethnic background. Although Northern 
Ghanaians are remunerated less than workers of other ethnic groups as they 
gain experience, this increasing wage gap is inconsistent with statistical 
discrimination (−). According to the authors, this result is more in line with the 
idea that Northerners face language barriers and/or that their lower 
educational attainment hinders their chances at promotion. Contrarily, 
inexperienced workers of the same ethnic group receive a positive wage 
premium that declines with increasing work experience, which provides some 
evidence for statistical discrimination (+). 
Bitzan (2009) North America 
(United States of 
America) 




The results indicate that the significant differences in earnings between white 
and black males can be partially explained by statistical discrimination (+), as 
white males receive higher rewards (wage) for lower-level productivity signals 
concerning educational attainment, while black males receive higher rewards 
for higher-level signals. 
Bjerk (2007) North America 
(United States of 
America) 
Black workers (white workers)f Correlational 
(panel) 
The results show that racial wage inequality in the white-collar job sector can 
be fully explained by controlling for academic skill level while this is only 
partially true for the blue-collar job sector. Both taste-based and statistical 
discrimination are consistent with the findings. Regarding statistical 
discrimination (+), it is theorised that the information mismatch in the white-
collar job sector is offset by the strong dependency of productivity on 
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academic skill, requiring employers to spend more resources on assessing the 
applicants’ skill levels. Regarding taste-based discrimination (+), it is theorised 
that academic skill is more important in the white-collar job sector, driving 




(United States of 
America) 
127 white NBA players (362 
black NBA players) 
Correlational 
(cross-sectional) 
The authors developed a model through which they were able to distinguish 
between employer (proxy: team manager race), co-worker (proxy: team racial 
composition) and customer discrimination (proxy: willingness to pay to see a 
team play) in the context of the NBA basketball competition. The results show 
that white players demand wage premiums for playing alongside black 
workers (i.e. employee discrimination) and black fans prefer to see teams play 
that, on average, line up a higher number of black players (i.e. customer 
discrimination). This is interpreted as evidence in favour of taste-based 
discrimination (+). 
Charles and Guryan 
(2008) 
North America 
(United States of 
America) 




The results provide support for several predictions of taste-based 
discrimination (+) with regard to racial animus. They suggest that, at the US 
state level, relative black wages vary negatively with the prejudice of the 
marginal person in the distribution, with the prejudice in the lower (left) tail of 
the prejudice distribution and with the fraction of the workforce that is black. 
Epstein et al. (2016) Middle East (Israel) 7,746 female Arab university 
graduates (115,424 female 
Jewish university graduates) 
Correlational 
(panel) 
The study suggests that Arab women are discriminated against vis-à-vis Jewish 
women in terms of wage when starting their career. This wage gap is non-
existent for their male counterparts. As time progresses, employees gain 
experience, the information on productivity-related characteristics increases 
and the existing wage gap for Arab women gradually disappears. This is 
evidence in favour of statistical discrimination (+). 
Fadlon (2015) North America 
(United States of 
America) 




The results suggest that racial minorities are discriminated against in the US 
labour market. Moreover, the wage of minority employees is more strongly 
correlated with productivity, measured by AFQT test scores, when they match 
the race of their employer than when they do not. Based on the assumption 
that matched employers are better informed about same-race employees 
than non-matched employers, the findings provide support for statistical 
discrimination (+). 
Fryer et al. (2013) North America 
(United States of 
America) 




The authors employ a search-matching model of labour market 
discrimination. The results indicate that the within-firm racial wage gap 
narrows with tenure by a return-to-tenure rate that is 1.1%-points higher for 
blacks than whites, providing evidence for the statistical learning hypothesis 





(United States of 
America) 
546 black male individuals 
(1,148 white male individuals) 
Correlational 
(panel) 
In contrast with predictions from statistical discrimination (−), the results 
suggest that black-white and dark-light wage gaps diverge over time as 
employees accumulate experience. On the other hand, the accumulation of 
experience has different effects for lighter- vis-à-vis darker-skinned blacks, in 
line with the dynamic model of statistical discrimination (+) postulated by 
Oettinger (1996). More specifically, the results suggest that the accumulation 
of experience produces smaller wage gains for darker-skinned blacks than 
lighter-skinned blacks. 




Workers of Turkish origin and 
repatriates (native Germans)h 
Correlational 
(cross-sectional) 
The authors put forward a signalling model of statistical discrimination in 
which they argue that if minorities’ educational qualifications carry less 
signalling power, poorly qualified members of the minority group will 
experience positive discrimination. The results indicate, in line with the 
authors’ model, that poorly qualified persons of Turkish origin appear to enjoy 
wage advantages in the labour market, which highly qualified peers do not. 
These findings are in line with statistical discrimination (+). 
C. Employment and Remuneration (Combined) 
Åslund et al. (2014) Northern Europe 
(Sweden) 




The results indicate that managers with an immigration background hire 
significantly more immigrant workers than native managers. Furthermore, the 
results show that employee–employer similarity is positively correlated with 
wages and negatively with exit rates. The biases found are generally more 
pronounced in the for-profit sector and highly competitive product markets, 
indicating that profit-maximizing concerns might explain the behaviour of 
employers better than taste-based discrimination (−). 
Borowczyk-Martins 
et al. (2017) 
North America 
(United States of 
America) 
1,516 black male workers in 
manufacturing (13,184 white 




The authors constructed a search and matching model of the labour market in 
which taste-based mechanisms, search frictions and skill complementarities 
were embedded. The findings suggest that the model, applied to data from 
the United States manufacturing industry, confirms predictions that 
employment rates and wages are lower for black workers vis-à-vis white 
workers, yet that the variance in wage and employment opportunities is 
smaller with regard to high-skilled employment. Their findings are in line with 
taste-based discrimination (+). 
Drydakis (2012) Southern Europe 
(Greece) 
946 fictitious female 
applicants of Albanian descent 
(946 fictitious female 




The results indicate that women of Albanian descent face lower chances of 
occupational access and lower wages vis-à-vis their Greek counterparts. There 
is no variation with job type as discrimination is not stronger for client-facing 
jobs (i.e. absence of customer discrimination), which is evidence against taste-
based discrimination (−). When women of Albanian descent disclose additional 
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information about themselves, wage offers increase, which is evidence for 
statistical discrimination (+). However, discrimination is not fully eliminated as 
the wage differential remains significant, which suggests that there remains a 





82 fictitious candidates with a 
Muslim-sounding name (80 




The findings indicate that decision makers discriminate even when their 
decision causes them to incur a financial penalty. However, discrimination 
decreases when the price of doing so increases. This is in line with taste-based 
discrimination (+). Furthermore, in the condition where no additional 
information about the candidates' productivity is available, rational beliefs 
about expected earnings do not explain the uncovered discrimination better, 




(United States of 
America) 





The authors developed a model incorporating taste-based discrimination and 
'belief-based' discrimination. As soon as a belief-based mechanism is 
introduced in the regression analysis, the results indicate that not taste but a 
'rational response' to beliefs that others might pursue ethnic discrimination 
explains the lower participation rates, lower income and reduced success in 
establishing interlinkages in the self-employment market for blacks. These 
results contradict taste-based discrimination (−). 
D. Other (Job Performance and Firm Productivity) 
Glover et al. (2017) Western Europe 
(France) 







and survey data) 
The results demonstrate that there is no evidence of negative 'animus' 
towards minorities: minorities do not report that biased managers seem to 
dislike them or assign them to unpleasant tasks. These results contradict 
taste-based discrimination (−). In contrast, the results indicate that biased 
managers spend less time with minority workers (i.e. they have fewer 
interactions). Because of this reduced interaction, minority workers put forth 
less effort when working with biased managers. This, in turn, confirms the 
negative prior biases of the managers, which is evidence in favour of statistical 
discrimination (+). 
Hjort (2014) East Africa (Kenya) 426 Kikuyu affiliated workers 




The results suggest that production output is lower in heterogeneous teams 
than in homogeneous teams as Kenyan workers discriminate against their 
non-co-ethnic co-workers. After a period of ethnic intra-country conflict, 
production output further decreased, presumably because of increased 
interethnic rivalry. Introducing a form of team remuneration significantly 
increased output in (horizontally mixed) heterogeneous teams. These results 
are in line with taste-based discrimination (+). 
54 
Notes. The following abbreviations are used: N/A (not applicable), USA (United States of America), NHL (National Hockey League), NBA (National Basketball Association), AFQT 
(Armed Forces Qualification Test). ‘(+)’ denotes supportive evidence while ‘(−)’ denotes contrary evidence. Regarding the studies that rely on (field) experimental research, the 
number of fictitious applicants in column three ‘Minority (majority)’ reflects the number of resumés that were sent out, not the number of unique applicant profiles. The 
classifications presented in the fourth column ‘Research design’ are based on Leary (2012)—the terms between brackets indicate the type of data used (for correlational research) 
or the research design subtype (for experimental research). The fifth column ‘Main findings related to the mechanisms’ reflects the classification regarding the empirical evidence 
on taste-based and statistical discrimination made by the respective authors on the grounds of their research findings. 
a The number of observations per ethnic group ranged from 2,091 to 18,403. 
b The total number of observations (sent out resumés) equalled 10,986. 
c The total number of observations ranged from 488,290 to 1,123,500 in function of the regression analyses that were performed. 
d The total sample size was 248. 
e Sample sizes ranged from 2,317 to 4,032. 
f Sample sizes ranged from 259 to 2,431. 
g Data at the US state level; the total sample size was 45. 
h The number of observations per ethnic group ranged from 318 to 267,966. 
I The number of observations per ethnic group ranged from 11,618 to 745,660. 
j The total number of observations, in function of the regression analyses, ranged from 14,719 to 26,339. 
k Sample sizes ranged from 61 to 220. 
l The analysis of the data was based on structural estimation. 
m We are aware that a similar research question has been addressed in previous studies which, in some cases, yielded comparable results (e.g. Decker, Ortiz, & Hedberg, 2015; 
Pager, 2003; Pager, Western, & Bonikowski, 2009). However, the results of these studies did not show that the absence of information on the applicant’s criminal history (e.g. due 
to ban-the-box measures) resulted in lower hiring chances for ethnic minorities but merely showed that there is an interaction effect of ethnicity and criminal record on employer 
call-back—when minority candidates had committed felonies, they were penalised more severely than their majority counterparts. Moreover, the findings of these studies were 
not interpreted in terms of taste-based or statistical discrimination and hence not included in this review, in line with our eligibility criteria. 
n Previous research of Asali (2010) also seems to support the premise of taste-based discrimination as the dominant mechanism in explaining discriminatory conduct, although this 
was not explicitly stated in the study. 
 
